

Central Intelligence Agency



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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE CPP/NPA INSURGENCY

Summary

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Moscow may be moving to exploit changing Communist Party of the Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA) attitudes toward the USSR.

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SOV M 83-10116

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This memorandum was prepared by [redacted] the Current Support Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to Chief, China-Third World Branch [redacted]

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[redacted] we have seen no public or private Soviet statements in the past two years which suggest greater optimism about the prospects for revolutionary change because of increased insurgent activity by the CPP/NPA. Moscow's rare public comment suggests the Soviets have viewed the CPP/NPA as a pro-Beijing tool not worthy of support. The most recent statement we found, a brief TASS dispatch on 23 February 1982, criticized increased "terrorist activity" by the NPA, which it labeled pro-Beijing, and attempted to link it to another group of "terrorists" allegedly directed by opposition leaders exiled in the US. [redacted]

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If it is true that CPP/NPA attitudes are changing, the USSR probably would want to encourage a trend that could modify the group's pro-Chinese orientation. In addition, Moscow would want to establish contact with a leftist group that could pose a major challenge to the Marcos government. Therefore, we think it possible that some Soviet material support might be provided to the CPP/NPA before long. It probably would not be as significant as the financial subsidy now being provided the PKP. It could also consist of guerrilla training--either in the USSR or in Soviet client states like Cuba, Vietnam, and Syria. [redacted]

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In our judgment, more substantial Soviet support, including arms aid, probably would not be forthcoming unless the party forsakes China and allies itself firmly with the USSR, reconciles with the PKP, and demonstrates more success than it has to date in mounting an effective challenge to the Marcos government. In those circumstances, Moscow might think that the CPA/NPA might more effectively accomplish the USSR's objective of removing the US bases.

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If the USSR were to switch its support to the CPP/NPA, however, it would have difficulty supplying substantial amounts of arms aid. This judgment is based on past Philippines' success in interdicting Chinese arms aid to the NPA and a presumed US willingness to use its air and naval assets in the area to help the Philippines identify suspected arms carriers. Moscow probably would try to conceal its own role in providing such assistance by working through its main client in East Asia, the Vietnamese, use junks or fishing boats to smuggle arms, or even perhaps hire Asian gunrunners to supply the CPP/NPA as the Chinese allegedly did in the early 1970s.

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